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I. Introduction
In 2008, Maine entered a new chapter in its organization of the county jail system.
In essence, the state agreed to freeze the local property tax, and assume responsibility for
financing any additional operational and some capital costs out of the General Fund, in
consideration for the counties submitting to the oversight of a newly created Board of
Corrections which would approve budgets, set goals, and champion economies of scale.
Now, five years later, the new system has displayed such serious shortcomings that the
Legislature has initiated a special study of what’s working and what’s not, and directed this
Commission to make recommendations for further reform by December 4, 2013. The following
report and draft legislation is provided in fulfillment of that mandate.

II. Executive Summary
The Board of Corrections and the Unified County Corrections System were created by the
Legislature in response to growing demands for inmate beds, proposed major capital spending
to meet the need and concerns about the efficiency of the autonomous county system and the
burden on local property taxpayers.
The Legislature adopted a hybrid solution to these challenges, “Capping county taxes in
exchange for making unused space available to house inmates from elsewhere in the system,”1
under the oversight of both the DOC and a new entity, the BOC. The BOC was invested with a
mandate to promote efficiency, reduce recidivism and several other goals. But it was not
equipped with sufficient authority or means to achieve those goals.
Recognizing the need for change, the 126th Legislature created a Commission to study the
system and report back in advance of the second session.
The Commission identified 10 major problems:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

An unrealistic funding process;
Lack of authority for the BOC
Too much time spent by the BOC on budget approval;
Goals and objectives neither defined nor met;
No jail standardization;
Innovative and high quality programs and incentives sacrificed;
Too many jails “not obeying the rules”;
The current funding crisis;
Excessive pre-trial populations, coordination with the judicial system; and

1

“Fund Report - Maine State Board of Corrections” RHR Smith & Co, CPAs, Accounting & Consulting
Services Contract #CT95E20125-3230, June 11, 2012, pg. 9.
Hereafter cited as “Smith.”
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10. Mental health needs inadequately addressed.
It then analyzed the root causes that contributed to the creation of these problems, namely:
1. Lack of a vision that the jails are part of a statewide criminal justice system which should
be for the common benefit and protection, and the fair distribution of the common
burden, of all the people of Maine;
2. Lack of ownership of the hybrid organization by the Legislature and Administration;
3. Lack of incentives and disincentives for system collaboration among the counties;
4. Incomplete executive leadership;
5. Lack of common accounting standards;
6. Lack of will and authority of the BOC to make and enforce critical decision; and,
7. Lack of a mechanism for systematic planning and funding capital expenses.
The Commission then considered four basic structural models for getting at the problems
identified and their causes.
Briefly, those models were:
1. A return to autonomous county management and incremental property tax funding for
future budget increases;
2. Creation of a new regional jail authority model with groups of 4 counties each following
the Two Bridges Regional Jail Authority model;
3. A complete state take-over; and
4. Modification of the current BOC model, to give the Board real authority over budgets,
contracts, standards and new construction.
Though each model had some appeal, the Commission settled on the modification of the
current BOC as the most practical. Based on these conclusions, the Commission recommends
the following changes to the current statute:
1. Vision:
Revise 34-A MRSA § 1801(2) to expressly state the BOC is empowered to adopt and
require compliance with procedures, policies and regulations to promote statewide
actions to plan, finance and execute a unified county correctional system.
2. BOC Representation:
By a majority vote, to retain the current membership composition of the BOC.
3. Provide enforcement incentives to assure compliance with BOC policies:
Amend 34-A § 1803 by adding a new subsection (12) to give the BOC explicit authority
to:
a. Provide discretionary funding for innovative projects;
b. In the event a county does not comply with a lawful directive of the BOC,
withhold funds otherwise allocated to that county until, in the judgment of the
BOC, it comes into compliance; and
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4.

5.

6.

7.

c. In the event of a major breach in its directives, recommend to the DOC that it
assume direct control of a facility pursuant to 34-A § 3009, in which case the
county would be responsible for the costs incurred by the DOC.
Executive Leadership:
Amend 34-A MRSA § 1803-A to make explicit the duties and expectations for managing
the business of the BOC by the Executive Director and the Financial Analyst, freeing the
Board members to concentrate on issues of broad policy.
Common Accounting Standards:
Amend 34-A MRSA § 1803(5)(E) to give the BOC authority to establish common
accounting standards consistent with State procedure concerning corrections related
county budgets and to establish and enforce standard performance matrix and reporting
formats for operational and capital investment issues as well. Rename the “Investment
Fund” the “State Operations Support Fund” to clear up confusion regarding the use of
these amounts.
BOC Authority:
Amend 34-A MRSA § 1803 to confer greater authority or the BOC to:
a. set standards
b. enter into contracts
c. offer back office services
d. assign inmates
e. encourage regional cooperation
f. monitor performance, and
g. collect and distribute funds, in order to promote economies of scale, efficiencies
in operations, orderly expenditures of available funds and other related purposes.
Capital Investment:
Amend 34-A MRSA 1803(4) to provide that the BOC shall affirmatively establish a
program for requiring 10 year major capital improvement plans from each of the
counties, and prioritize projects for funding. These projects would then be funded by
the creation of a transitional legislative provision to fund “Inverse Debt” in an amount
equal to 10% per year of the estimated total CIP cost over the upcoming 10 year period
for all capital projects of more than $250,000. This new fund could then be called the
“Major Capital Projects Sinking Fund”
For major capital needs, funding should be underwritten by a combination of State
Appropriations and county bond issues in a way that ensures no county is required to
make a property tax effort greater than the average for all counties. For projects of less
than $100,000 the county should be able to call upon its own reserves, and 30-A MRSA
§ 924(2) should be amended to allow fund balances to be maintained by the county
based on 20% of corrections expenditures, as recommended by RHR Smith.2
It is the view of the Commission that county surplus funds should be available for use in
a capital improvement program and placed in a capital improvement fund for a program

2

Smith, p 15
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approved by the BOC. Surplus funds may also be dedicated to a county’s unfunded
liability to the amount identified in the county budget, with the approval of the BOC.
8. Supplementary Legislation:
In addition to the foregoing measures to address the root causes of the BOC’s problems,
the Commission further recommends changes to achieve the goals of the BOC
Legislation as follows:
a. Amend 34-A MRSA § 1803(3)(A) to improve pretrial management of cases by
i.
mandating pretrial diversion and bail services statewide;
ii.
developing and utilizing a standard minimum risk questionnaire to
facilitate the use of bail in appropriate cases; and
iii.
mandatory provision of video links with reliable interconnections in each
jail for use for arraignments and other appropropriate proceedings and
trading usage by judges and DAs of such facilities.
9. It now appears that the budget is likely to be approximately $2.8 million short for FY
2014 given certain assumptions. This Legislation should address that shortfall and
ensure a realistic amount for FY 20153 and begin funding the sinking fund for future
capital consideration by a supplemental appropriation bill for consideration at the 2nd
session of the 126th Legislature.

III. Mandate of the Commission
The 126th Legislature enacted the creation of a Joint Study Order Establishing a Commission to
Study the State Board of Corrections and the Unified County Corrections System by LR 2171,
which reads as follows:
126th Maine Legislature, LR 2171
Joint Study Order Establishing the Commission To Study the State Board of Corrections and the
Unified County Corrections System
ORDERED, the Senate concurring, that, notwithstanding Joint Rule 353, the Blue
Ribbon Commission To Study the State Board of Corrections and the Unified County
Corrections System, referred to in this order as "the commission," is established as
follows:
1. Membership. The commission consists of the following members:
A. Three county commissioners, one of whom is appointed by the President of the
Senate and 2 of whom are appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
from a list of 5 county commissioners submitted by the Maine County Commissioners
Association;
B. Three county administrators, 2 of whom are appointed by the President of the
Senate and one of whom is appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
from a list of 5 county administrators submitted by the Maine Association of County
Administrators and Managers;
C. Two jail administrators, one of whom is appointed by the President of the Senate
3

See Appendix K
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and one of whom is appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives from a
list of 4 jail administrators submitted by the Maine Jail Administrators Association;
D. Two sheriffs, one of whom is appointed by the President of the Senate and one of
whom is appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives from a list of 4
sheriffs submitted by the Maine Sheriffs Association; and
E. A member of the public, appointed jointly by the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
invite the Commissioner of Corrections, or the commissioner's designee, and the chair
of the State Board of Corrections to participate as members.
2. Chair. The public member appointed pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph F serves
as chair of the commission.
3. Appointments; convening. All appointments must be made no later than 30 days
following the passage of this order. The appointing authorities shall notify the
Executive Director of the Legislative Council once all appointments have been
completed. When the appointment of all members has been completed, the chair shall
call and convene the first meeting of the commission. If 30 days or more after passage
of this order a majority of but not all appointments have been made, the chair may
request authority and the Legislative Council may grant authority for the commission
to meet and conduct its business.
4. Duties. The commission shall:
A. Review the current structure of the county jail corrections system, including but
not limited to its source of revenues, the predictability of costs and revenues and
strengths and weaknesses of the current system, in order to determine methods for
long-term sustainability of funding, best practices and necessary processes;
B. Review and propose revisions, if necessary, to the mission and authority of the
State Board of Corrections; and
C. Clarify the structure and authority of the unified system of corrections and the State Board of
Corrections and develop recommendations to strengthen centralization of the system and
control and coordination of operations.
5. Staff assistance. The Legislative Council may seek the provision of staffing
services from a non-legislative entity, including the Maine County Commissioners
Association. The Legislative Council may not incur any costs for staffing services
provided pursuant to this subsection.
6. Outside funding. The commission shall seek funding contributions to fully fund
the costs of the study. All funding is subject to approval by the Legislative Council in
accordance with its policies. If sufficient contributions to fund the study have not been
received within 30 days after the passage of this order, no meetings are authorized and
no expenses of any kind may be incurred or reimbursed.
7. Report. No later than December 4, 2013, the commission shall submit a report that
includes its findings and recommendations, including suggested legislation, to the
Joint Standing Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety.
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IV. Commission Membership
After extensive consultation, 15 members were appointed to the Commission by the Speaker,
Mark Eves, and the Senate President, Justin Alfond. The public member, David Flanagan, a
retired executive and attorney, served as chair. The commission has been staffed by Bill
Whitten, Deputy County Manager, Elizabeth Trice, Grants & Special Projects Coordinator, and
Amy Fickett, Public Relations Coordinator, all loaned from Cumberland County.
David Flanagan

Chair

Public Member

Capt. Marsha
Alexander

Jail Administrator

Kennebec County

Bob Devlin

County Manager

Kennebec County

John Lebel

Jail Administrator

Androscoggin County

Greg Zinser

County Manager

York County

James Cloutier

County Commissioner

Cumberland County

Joel Merry

Sheriff

Sagadahoc County, Sheriff’s Assn.

Joseph Ponte

DOC Commissioner

Department of Corrections

Lawrence (Max)
Dawson

County Commissioner

Sagadahoc County

Mark Westrum

BOC Designee

Two Bridges Regional Jail, Chair of BOC,
President of MJAA

Maurice (Mo)
Ouellette

Sheriff

York County, VP of Sheriff’s Association

Peter Baldacci

County Commissioner

Penobscot County

Peter Crichton

County Manager

Cumberland County

Rep. Aaron Frey

Representative

Legislator, from Bangor, Approps. Com.

Sen. Pat Flood

Senator

Legislator, Winthrop, Approps. Com.
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V. Commission Process
In order to deal with such a complex issue in such a short space of time, the Commission
organized its work as follows:
1. Six plenary meetings were conducted between September 20 and December 6, 2013,
which were noticed and open to the public, with a broadcasting link for interested parties
who were unable to get to Augusta for the meetings.4
2. At the first meeting the Chair outlined a process to be followed: (i) defining the problem;
(ii) identifying the issues; (iii) creating a vision; (iv) conducting fair, fact-based hearings;
(v) evaluating the root causes of the problems; (vi) reviewing the pros and cons of
alternative governance models; and (vii) identifying opportunities for savings and
efficiencies.
3. Invitations were sent to all groups believed to have an interest in the subject matter of
the Commission, requesting their participation and testimony.
4. A public hearing to take testimony was conducted on October 4, 2013.
5. Interviews were conducted with policy makers and experts with relevant information,
including Rod Miller, CRS Inc.; Sheriff Michael L. Chapman of Louden County, Virginia;
Governor LePage and his legal counsel, Chief Justice Leigh Saufley and Chief Judge
Charles Laverdiere, members of the Legislature and Elizabeth Simoni of Maine Pretrial
Services.
6. The Commission identified ten issues of particular concern and divided into five
subcommittees to discuss them in depth.
7. Those subcommittees then developed potential approaches, to the problems identified
with each subcommittee dealing with two of the ten problems, and then, acting as a
committee of the whole, which then polled itself on the preferred solutions.
8. The staff developed an extensive online file of past reports evaluating the system, and
other relevant documents, for the members’ reference.
9. The Commission developed and discussed four general approaches to dealing with the
issues and potential solutions: 1) return to complete management and all incremental
funding by the individual counties; 2) development of a comprehensive regional jail
system through four new regional authorities 3) a complete state takeover of all county
corrections responsibilities; ; and 4) strengthening the current hybrid state/county
approach by changing the BOC composition and granting it real authority.
10. The commission asked the Legislative Council for an extension of the deadline for its
work from December 4 to December 15, 2013, which was granted, and it has completed
this final report.

VI. History of County Jails in Maine, 1653-1970
Just 33 years after the Pilgrims first set foot on Plymouth Rock in 1620, our Puritan ancestors
saw fit to authorize a prison for the Province of Maine.
4The

agendas of the six meetings are attached as Appendix B.
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After some delay, a building for this purpose was erected at Meetinghouse Creek in the Village
of York in 1656. The present Gaol was built in 1719 with timbers salvaged from the original
structure. With the influx of settlers into Maine in the mid-18th century, the building was
enlarged to provide more space for the housing of prisoners, as well as improving
accommodations for the gaoler's family. The humanitarian drive to better prison conditions for
debtors following the American Revolution resulted in the addition of a large debtor's cell in the
1790s, giving the building its present shape.
Until 1760 the Gaol was a prison for the entire Province of Maine. It served as a county jail from
1760 until 1820. For the next forty years it continued to be used for the incarceration of local
wrongdoers.5 It remains in existence today as a museum.
An additional jail was built as each new county was incorporated, as Maine continued the
system created by Massachusetts after 1820, with the counties’ major role “to administer justice,
rather than provide general services or enforce local policies.”6
But some evolution did occur. Originally the jails or lockups were entirely a local responsibility.
“Here thieves, arsonists, debtors (by far the majority), murderers and all other criminals in the
county be held until their punishment was decided, or (until 1820) they could be dealt with at
Massachusetts facilities.7 But county jails “became increasingly inadequate to house the State’s
criminal population and the need for a state prison became apparent. The Thomaston facility
opened in 1824 with a small staff of guards under Chief Warden Daniel Rose.” 8
So nearly 200 years ago Maine started down the road of managing two separate jail systems,
one county and one State. Overall, during the 19th and 20th centuries little changed in public
policy toward the operation of the county jail system. Elected sheriffs reigned over the pretrial
detention and correctional system in each county. Small counties with low populations built and
maintained small jails. The reality of Maine’s geography prevented any idea of consolidation
during the era of horse and buggy.

VII. History of County Jails in Maine 1970-2008
Only Sagadahoc County eventually avoided building a modern facility, instead boarding its
inmates at neighboring jails. Then during the building boom from 1990 to 2008 Lincoln and
Sagadahoc formed a regional jail authority and built the Two Bridges Regional Jail, 30-A MRSA
§1801, et. seq.

5

www.oldyork.org/buildings/gaol.html 12/2/13
Maine had nine counties by 1820 and added seven more thereafter. “Maine Politics and Government”
Kenneth Palmer et al, University of Nebraska Press 1992, p 173.
7 “Maine: the Pine Tree State from Prehistory to the Present” Richard Judd et al, University of Maine
Press 1995, p 230.
8 Ibid., p 200.
6
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Over the last several decades, other large modern facilities were constructed in Cumberland,
York, and Somerset. Medium size jails were built in Penobscot, Kennebec, and Androscoggin.
Smaller facilities were constructed in rural counties across the state.
A rash of new construction was stimulated by a sharp increase in the number of people caught
up in the criminal justice system in this period, and by the age and condition of some older jails.9

The Department of Corrections, having regulatory oversight10, required the newer facilities to be
built to a twenty-year projected capacity, creating a large surplus of empty beds. This surplus of
bed space was created in anticipation of an increased crime rate. In actuality, the criminal

9 “A

1978 statewide jail study conducted by the Maine Sheriff’s Association revealed substandard
conditions in most Maine Jails. At that time the average age of a jail bed was 80 years. Facilities that
were 152 years old were still in service.” “Technical Assistance Report for the Maine Board of
Corrections,” Rod Miller and Rebecca Ney, National Institute of Corrections vs Dept. of Justice, June 28,
2011, p. 28. Hereafter cited as “NIC Report.”
10 The Department of Corrections sets standards for jails, conducts inspections, and is empowered to
enforce compliance. “If a county or municipality fails to correct deficiencies and offers no plan of
correction, or if the plan of correction offered to the department is determined inadequate by the
commissioner, the commissioner shall determine an appropriate action to restrict or modify the operations
of the facility, consistent with the nature of the uncorrected deficiencies, which action may include
ordering an entire facility closed until the deficiencies have been corrected.” Emergency powers are also
allowed if the noncompliance is determined to endanger the safety of the staff, inmates or visitors Title
34-A MRSA § 1208.
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caseload decreased from over 70,000 cases per year in 2009 to 57,000 cases per year in
2013.11
These thirty-million dollar facilities (Somerset, Cumberland and Two Bridges) were entirely
funded through the county property tax and often sold to the voters with the claim that the empty
beds would be filled by counties with overcrowded jails needing bed space. The “county
adopted boarding rate” was set at a premium price and inmates soon became a commodity
where counties with empty beds bid against each other for a body to fill the bed. The prices
ranged from $80 to $150/day.
During this period, the jail budget represented approximately 50% of the county assessment
each year. The counties were proposing $110 million in capital projects to increase jail capacity
and alleviate a perceived system-wide overcrowding issue. Major capital projects were
proposed in Kennebec, Cumberland and Waldo counties.12 A study conducted by the Baldacci
Administration found that capacity existed within the system and jail expenditures were growing
at an average of 9% over the previous five years. Much of this growth was attributed to new
debt due to jail construction.13

VIII. History of County Jails in Maine 2008-2013
By 2008 the county jail system was costing property taxpayers in Maine $62,000,000 annually.
The Maine Jail and Community Corrections System Report predicted in 2008 the county system
could have a capacity of 2,382 inmates, with the expected opening of the Somerset jail in 2009,
a 29% increase over 2007, when the county jails were housing approximately 1,689 inmates.
In addition, the State of Maine Department of Corrections was housing 2,060 adult prisoners at
an annual cost of $79.3 million. The state system was overcrowded and the Legislature turned
down the proposal to house prisoners out of state. Still facing an overcrowding problem, the
state’s eyes turned to the empty beds in the county system.
In response to this cost and capacity escalation, the Baldacci Administration proposed a direct
state takeover of the county jail system, with jail administration and financing to become a
responsibility of the State DOC.

11 Jail

population increased from 1,113 to 1,642 from 1999 to 2006, BJS Census of Jail Facilities 2006
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cjf06.pdf. See Appendix D for charts of “Maine State Caseload 5-year
Trends” 2009-2013.
12 In 2003 Waldo County lost a referendum to replace its jail, and in 2008 Cumberland County lost a
referendum to expand its medical pod. See Appendix F for a complete list of capital projects proposed in
2007/2008
13 CAAC Study 2006
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After that proposal to absorb the county system failed, the State, counties and Maine Municipal
Association entered into negotiations to unify the system. The result of those protracted
negotiations14 was that:
A. The Maine Board of Corrections (BOC) was created 34-A MRSA 1801, et seq.;
B. The State would gain access to county beds at a marginal rate. The marginal
rate reflected the incremental cost of adding an inmate in a facility without
requiring additional staff, ranging from $24-$45/day depending on county, and
that rate was set by the BOC.
C. The property tax assessment on county corrections would be capped at the 2008
dollar level, 30-A MRSA §701(2-A).
D. Counties would be responsible for any debt incurred before 2008, 30-A MRSA §
701(2-B).
E. The Legislature would appropriate funds to meet the increasing cost of county jail
operations through the General Fund, based on a growth rate set by the BOC,
34-A MRSA § 1805.
F. The Legislature would appropriate and fund a Capital Improvement Plan based
“inversely” on the difference between the debt at 2008 and the amount of debt
paid by the counties annually each year forward, 34-A MRSA § 1803(5)(E).
As a result of the 2008 reforms:
1. The state got the needed beds at a marginal rate, which did not include any
accounting for future capacity costs;
2. The municipalities got the property tax capped;
3. Overcrowding was eliminated in the county system as surplus beds were made
available at the marginal rate;
4. The counties received State General Fund contributions to support the jails;15
5. Three county jails were converted to 72 hour holding facilities;16
6. The “inverse debt” obligation to fund new capital construction was assumed, but
then not funded, by the State;
7. County inmates were no longer treated as a commodity to be assigned to other
facilities on a bid basis.
The Board of Corrections and members of the Corrections Working Group dedicated long days
and thousands of hours to tackle the daunting task of creating a unified system.
●
Training seminars were offered on how the system should work.
●
Financial reporting systems were created.
●
Programs to coordinate transportation (transportation hubs) were created and large
efficiencies were realized regarding moving county inmates around the state.
14

LD 2080, “An Act to Better Coordinate and Reduce the Cost of the Delivery of State and County
Correctional Services,” was signed by the Governor on April 18, 2008 and became PL 2009, Chapter
653.
15 See Appendix J
16 Oxford, Franklin, and Waldo
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At first the counties cooperated, many reluctantly, to provide budgets and plans to get the
system moving. But, passage of the budgets became an endless task, with repeated
submissions and onerous scrubbing of individual county budgets.
It became apparent early on that deferred maintenance and capital improvements, as well as
wage increases, had become a priority now that the state was funding incremental costs. There
were no consequences for deficit spending or lack of capital planning.
Still, most county officials felt the system could and should work to find efficiencies and
cooperation where possible. The operational budgets were tight but in most cases adequately
funded. Some counties ran surpluses that were put towards capital improvements. Additional
investment fund monies were allocated to Aroostook County to make up for a deficit at the end
of its fiscal years. Some counties managed their budgets carefully and created small surpluses
to fund capital improvements and innovative programming.
However, the perception that the Legislature had reneged on its promise to fund the operational
budget and the reality that the Legislature never funded the inverse debt, the defacto capital
sinking fund, has kept the Board and counties in a carousel of endless budget proposals and
capital needs requests.
A form of battle fatigue set in with the counties.
The original statute was amended to add additional county members to the board.17 The Board
and Working Group were repopulated with new blood, but the issues hadn’t changed, and the
working group became gridlocked with minor issues and made little progress towards
addressing the critical issues. The Subcommittees of the working group stopped functioning.
The budget focus group, consisting of several county finance directors, county administrators
and state finance officials was disbanded and replaced by three BOC members.
The system was floundering:
●
Money from the investment fund was diverted from the operations budgets to help
counties pave parking lots, fix roofs and address deferred maintenance with no overall
capital planning. Innovative programs to address recidivism had their funding cut.
●
Deficit spending continued and some wage increases far outpaced the norm for other
Maine public sector workers.
●
Revenues for federal boarding were being used to pay debt instead of supporting the
operational budget and the BOC faced a legal challenge over this use of funding.18
●
Jails with empty beds stopped accepting inmates from overcrowded facilities,
compounding the problem and forcing 72 hour hold counties to drive extra miles to find a
bed.

17 County
18

representation moved from two to four. MRSA 34-A § 1802(1).
Somerset County v. State Board of Corrections, Somerset county Dkt No. AP-13-004(2013)
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The plan to create a system designed to find efficiencies, enhance programs to reduce
recidivism and prevent overcrowding has been lost amongst turf battles over budget dollars and
a sense of loss of local control and the lack of funding by the Legislature. Further, the
Appropriations Committee did not get timely information, and as a result, funding requests fell
behind the necessary schedule.
The state flat funded FY14 and FY15 appropriation to the county system19 causing cuts to
staffing and programs as a result of the systems’ inability to make clear and convincing
justifications in a timely manner within the state budget process.
Since FY10 county jail expenditures have grown on average 2.4%, primarily in the areas of
wages and benefits (3.4% or $6.6 million); commodities and contracts (.8% increase, or $.7
million); while experiencing a reduction of 7.2% (-$.4 million) in capital spending.
As authorized by 34-A MRSA § 1202(5), the DOC is currently providing staff support for the
BOC, including Scott Ferguson from the DOC for financial management, while Attorney General
Janet Mills is providing legal counsel for the Board.
The DOC is further assisting the counties by providing housing for some county inmates to
avoid local overcrowding, though there is at least one recent case in which a pretrial detainee in
Franklin County was sent to the Men’s Correctional Center in Windham and sought bail on the
grounds that pretrial detention in a distant state facility was a violation of his rights. The
presiding judge has dismissed the claim, but similar cases are likely to arise.20

IX. What the BOC System Has Achieved
Primarily through the hard work of numerous individuals, the BOC system has made some
progress over the preceding independent county system:
1. Saving the DOC and the State $2.9m in the first year of operation by making jail
beds available to State inmates at cost.21
2. The capital construction boom has stopped, with the $100M program
contemplated in 2008 now a dead letter.22
3. The rapidly increasing burden on local property taxpayers was stopped in its
tracks.
4. Some savings have been realized by converting the Oxford, Franklin and Waldo
county jails to 72-hour lock ups.23

19 The

Legislature appropriated FY 2010: $9,1369,506; FY 2011: $9,058,217; FY 2012: $12,650,035; FY
2013: 12,039,128; FY 2014: $12,202,857; FY 2015: $12,202,857.
20 Parker v State, Franklin County Superior Court. See “Attorney seeks release of suspect forced to await
trial in distant prison,” Kaitlin Schroeder, Maine Sunday Telegram, Nov. 3, 2013, p B2
21 NIC Report, p 6
22 The BOC took credit for this cancellation, though Miller & Ney disagreed, arguing instead the new
construction was merely delayed. Ibid. p 34
23 Ibid. p 33
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5. More savings have been achieved by development of a cooperative
transportation system for moving prisoners around, particularly in Northern and
Eastern Maine.
6. The practice of setting boarding prices by bidding for inmates ended.

X. What the BOC System was intended to achieve, but has not:
The objectives of the BOC were set out in the legislation creating it as follows:
The first section of the legislation, Title 34-A §1801(1), states that “The State Board of
Corrections is an autonomous body whose purpose is to develop and implement a
coordinated correctional system that demonstrates sound fiscal management, achieves
efficiencies, reduces recidivism and ensures the safety and security of correctional staff,
inmates, visitors, volunteers and surrounding communities.” The statute also directs the
Board to develop goals including benchmarks for performance in the following areas: A.
Recidivism reduction; B. Pretrial diversion; and C. Rate of incarceration, 34-A MRSA §
1801(2).
The actual achievements of the BOC have fallen short of the goals. For example:
1. Costs continued to increase24 since 2008, so that Maine has a per capita cost for
county inmates of $59.94, the tenth highest among the states.

24 In

the first biennium of the BOC overall costs rose at a rate of 3.5%, but in its second biennium, that
rate decreased to 2.45%, and for FY14-15, the actual rate is believed to be 5.5%.
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2. There has been no coordinated capital planning, and limited appropriation for capital
construction, contrary to the “inverse debt” funding promise in 2008.
3. The BOC has been limited in new funding from the Legislature, and appropriations
have risen from a starting point of approximately $5.7 Million for FY2008 to
approximately $13 Million for FY13, with the operations deficits for those 5 years made
up by savings from the conversion of three county jails to 72-hour lock ups.
4. The fiscal shortfall has reached the point that it is anticipated that at the current rate of
spending, the county jails will require a supplemental appropriation of around $2.8
million for 2014, excluding Somerset, based on current assumptions, or else will run
out of money sometime in the fourth quarter of FY14.25
5. The BOC has been unable to fulfill several of the statutory mandates included in the
2008 legislation which were intended to improve management efficiency and reduce
both recidivism and the rate of incarceration, and increase pretrial diversions.26
6. For the most part, the BOC has been mired in a decision making impasse for a long
time, unable to reach decisions on critical matters concerning county jail budgets and
only recently was able to allocate some $5.6 million for programs to reduce
recidivism.27

XI. Why the BOC has failed
Despite tremendous efforts by many Maine people in government at all levels and volunteers
serving their civic duty, and the tireless leadership from BOC Chairs Neale Duffett and Col.
Mark Westrum, the BOC has failed to achieve the initial expectations of the Legislature in
creating this novel, hybrid system.
It has failed to:
1. Achieve cost reductions through collective contracting for goods and services;
2. Secure budget discipline at the county level or full state funding for its budget requests;
3. Address its mandate concerning reductions in recidivism and pretrial services;
4. Achieve standardization regarding staffing and equipment;
5. Develop a unified plan for capital investment; or
6. Win the trust and confidence of the Legislature.

25 See

Appendix I
The NIC Report contains a table at pp. 8-11 detailing the 47 statutory mandates requiring action by the
BOC, a copy of which is attached. Of those 47, in 2011 the NIC determined that fully 15 were not
complete, 19 were “partially complete,” and only 11 were actually completed (the rest were basically
“unknown”). A review in connection with this report indicated that 15, including crucially, developing “goals
to guide the development and evaluate the effectiveness” of the new system and “develop a plan for
‘managing costs’” have not been completed. Since 2011, no additional mandates appear to have been
completed, or even undertaken. See these tables in Appendix A.
27 “Jails will get more funds for reducing recidivism,” Craig Crosby, Portland Press Herald, Nov. 25, 2013,
p C1
26

27
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The BOC legislation has failed to adequately address 10 specific and serious problems
identified by the Commission including:
1. An unrealistic funding process;
2. Lack of authority for the BOC
3. Too much time spent by the BOC on budget approval;
4. Goals and objectives neither defined nor met;
5. No jail standardization;
6. Innovative and high quality programs and incentives sacrificed;
7. Too many jails “not obeying the rules”;
8. The current funding crisis;
9. Excessive pre-trial populations, cooperation with the judicial system; and
10. Mental health needs inadequately addressed.
What are the root causes of these results?
1. Lack of a vision that the jails are part of a Statewide criminal justice system which should be
for the common benefit and protection, and the equal distribution of the common burden, of all
the people of Maine.
As the framers of the US Constitution argued, the safety of society is among the transcendent
objects of government, and justice is its purpose.28
As noted above, criminal justice started out in the Massachusetts Bay Colony as a county
responsibility, as the dictates of colonial transportation and communications demanded.
Since then Maine has successfully modified other institutions in its criminal justice system, as
the courts now operate on a statewide basis, with its judges now funded through the state
General Fund, though the counties retain a role in owning and maintaining courthouses.
Likewise, the District Attorney system has been updated, with multi-county districts and state
funding for the salaries of the District Attorneys and their assistants, 30-A MRSA § 255(2).
The result of the continued fragmented jail system has been a lack of reasonably equal
opportunities for pre-trial services for diversion programs, regardless of location, and a
significant disparity in the tax burden among the various counties,29 as well as inability to
achieve potential economies of scale and other efficiencies.
This lack of vision for a single statewide criminal justice system has contributed to the problems
identified by the Commission.

28 The
29 See

Federalist Papers No. 43 and 51 (Madison).
Appendix H
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2. BOC representation and lack of ownership of this hybrid organization by the Legislature and
Administration.
As the NIC report explains, “There are no counterparts to the Board’s structure in other
states...the difficulties encountered in Maine in the last four years explain why no other state has
tried a similar approach. We believe that no one will be looking to Maine as a model.”30
The BOC does not have an independent source of funding. It is entirely dependent on the
counties through the property tax, and the Legislature through the General Fund.
But the Board now consists of nine members, of whom four are county officials, and only two
representative of the interests and concerns of the Administration. Additionally one is a
municipal official, while two represent the general public, one of whom should be a mental
health specialist, 34-A MRSA § 1802(1).
In 34-A MRSA § 1801 the Legislature declared the BOC to be an “autonomous body.” But it
does not operate in a vacuum, and is dependent on the Counties, and increasingly, the State,
for appropriations. There is no escaping the reality its budget priorities must compete with all
others vying for State funds.
There is a risk that the absence of adequate representation reflecting the priorities of the payor,
leads to a loss of understanding of the needs of the county corrections system by the
Legislature and a lack of confidence in the decisions the Board is making.
A dominant representation by county officials also contributes to a lack of incentive to scrutinize
county jail operations and to make hard decisions. These realities have contributed to State
appropriations less than the BOC has requested and a total lack of State investment in the
capital investment sinking fund.
This lack of ‘ownership’ has contributed to several of the problems identified by the
Commission.
On the other hand, extensive county representation does provide much needed experience and
expertise concerning the county jail system, which is valuable in the BOC’s deliberations. The
Legislature will have to resolve the tension between these two competing considerations.
3. Lack of incentives and disincentives for systematic collaboration by the counties.
While individual counties readily reach informal, ad hoc mutual aid agreements, there is no
culture or tradition of consistent collaboration to achieve the standardization necessary to
realize long term economies of scale.

30

NIC Report, p 36
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Every county, understandably, seeks to maximize its own benefit, rather than optimize results
system wide. Understandable, because there are few incentives in the form of retaining savings,
eligibility for programs or avoiding sanctions. The result is a confederacy of autonomous
governmental units acting in their own best interests, rather than a union looking to achieve
common standards and making the best use of resources for the whole state.
This lack of incentives and disincentives for systematic collaboration by the counties has
contributed to many of the problems identified by the Commission.
4. Lack of executive leadership.
The BOC is a part-time job for nominal consideration for its members, yet has consumed an
enormous amount of their time and attention.31
It has suffered from the lack of a consistent, full-time, professional, empowered executive and a
finance director who can organize agendas, prioritize issues, scrutinize budgets and collect
information, so that the Board members themselves can concentrate on broad policy issues.
Fortunately, an executive director and financial analyst have both been hired this fall.
This shortcoming has resulted in at least two major problems that have crippled the system:
1. The board members themselves have ended up consuming all available time on
reviewing the minutia of the individual county budgets, repeatedly sending
versions back for revision, but not assembling a single overall budget within
realistic parameters.
2. Because all the time and effort of the BOC has been expended on budget review,
the Board has been unable to take action on the many other mandates
established by the legislature as outlined in Appendix A.
Thus, the lack of an empowered executive has contributed to the problems identified by the
Commission.
5. Lack of common accounting standards.
The lack of uniformity in how the counties account for expenditures, and of standardization for
metrics, makes it very difficult to measure performance or even compare correlations-related
spending among the various counties.32
A good example of this problem was provided in the RHR Smith report: “Since costs are not
categorized consistently, it may be time consuming to identify and quantify potential savings.
31 5

MRSA §1200A-G, sub-§ 6-C
“There have been instances of inconsistency, resulting from the Counties’ lack of clear understanding
of their responsibilities and of the BOC’s expectations regarding budgeting, allocations, cash flow needs,
fund balance and contingency funding. This makes it difficult to compare data between time periods on
countries for meaningful analysis,” Smith, p 4.

32
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Using information technology for example, IT costs may be included in capital, wages and/or
contracts, making them difficult to isolate or measure.” 33
In turn, lack of metrics makes it extremely difficult analyzing where economies of scale and
efficiencies of performance may be achieved.
It may be that the BOC has the implied authority to require such accounting and reporting
standardization, under 34-A MRSA § 1801(1), 1803(1)(A) and 1803(5)(D), and 30-A MRSA §
710(1), but if so, it has failed to effectively exercise such authority.
The lack of such standards has contributed to several of the problems identified by the
Commission.
6. Lack of will and authority at the BOC to make and enforce critical decisions.
The system suffers from the failure of the BOC to present budgets to the Legislature that drive
down the requests of the various counties to a realistic overall figure, instead acquiescing in the
incremental demands of the counties.
Likewise, the Board has been unwilling to enforce decisions against uncooperative counties that
fail to conform with its policies and rules, for example the refusal of Somerset County to accept
prisoners from other counties.
This problem was summed up in the NIC report: “One of the issues most often cited by those
interviewed is the perception the BOC does not exercise its leadership and decision-making
authority to [move toward a version of One Maine, One System].”34
Many interviewees put it succinctly: “There are too many meetings that don’t accomplish
anything.”35
The lack of will by the BOC to make and enforce decisions has contributed to the problems
identified by the Commission.
7. Lack of a mechanism for planning and funding capital expenditures.
There is no centralized record of how much has been spent on capital projects since the BOC
was created.

33

Smith, p 7. Likewise, the BOC lacks reliable non-financial metrics as well. “The BOC has not developed
a plan for measuring its progress beyond costs benefits. Some, like pretrial services, do attempt to
quantify their outcomes, but generally the notion of a performance management plan does not yet exist.”
NIC Report, p 17.
34 NIC Report, p 16.
35 NIC Report, p 14.
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Likewise, there is no CRAS module for uniform accounting for capital expenditures.
Further, there is no mechanism for compiling aggregated data as to the needs for capital
investment to maintain or replace facilities, let alone for prioritizing needs.
Instead, there is a passive certificate of need review process under which the BOC is to rule on
the merits of such proposals or individual counties may care to make. 34-A MRSA § 1803 (4).
Or, in the alternative, counties can ask for ad hoc funding for capital projects out of the
Investment Fund, which is primarily intended as the vehicle to fund General Fund contributions
to the county corrections operations but, confusingly, also can be used to pay for capital
projects. 34-A MRSA § 1806(2).
In practice, such requests are made without reference to an overall plan or consistent with any
articulated criteria.
Without any comprehensive plan, any criteria for funding projects, any priorities, any guess as to
the total amount which may be needed from year to year, or even any consistent mechanism, it
is hardly surprising that the Legislature has never funded the Inverse Debt account intended to
fund county corrections capital projects. 34-A MRSA § 1803 (5) (E).
Yet, the physical infrastructure inexorably ages and, according to the 2013 BJA study,
decays.36
The lack of such a mechanism for planning and funding has contributed substantially to the
failure to do the necessary planning and investing.
In closing this analysis, we need to state that these problems are not the products of failings on
the part of individuals. Many good Maine people have worked hard these last five years to try to
make this hybrid system work. The problems are not individuals, but flawed institutions,
complicated legal arrangements and inadequate mechanisms for achieving progress.
They are problems that can be solved.

XII. The concerns of the Legislature
In its communication to the Criminal Justice Committee of June 3, the Appropriations Committee
noted that the jails were acting like a decentralized confederation, and that several problems
had arisen as a result, including:
1. Constant adjustments to the budget;
2. Inability to coordinate and control operations among the counties;
3. Inability by the BOC to enforce its decisions;
36 Miller

2013 Bureau of Justice Administration, USDOJ study, p 3.
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4. Counties opting out of the system with impunity;
5. Uncertainty as to the amount of revenues available because of the unilateral actions of
some counties; and
6. Inequity in the sharing of the burden of capital construction debt.
In sum, the Committee expressed a lack of confidence in the ability of the BOC to manage its
finances and create the unified system originally envisioned.37

XIII. Statement of the Problem
The identification of the issues related to the shortcomings of the current system led the
Commission to adopt the following statement of the problem:
Maine has adopted a system of governance of its county jails and lockups that
fragments decision-making with respect to (1) raising revenues; (2) managing budgets;
and (3) achieving operational efficiency, which has resulted in uncertainty, absence of
accountability, deteriorating incentives for efficiency and now a funding crisis.
The mandate of this Commission, of course, was not just to identify the problems, or to analyze
their root causes, but to go further and come up with recommendations for solutions.

XIV. Alternative Models for Restructuring and Reform
We have described a formidable set of problems, and analyzed what we believe are their
fundamental root causes.
The Commission evaluated four potential approaches to addressing these issues:
1. Return to the pre-2008 system of individual county responsibility.
This approach has the virtues of reasonably clear accountability for a single political
decision-maker, the County Commissioners, although there is some ambiguity in the
relative accountability of the Commissioners and the Sheriffs38, and a reintegration of
decision-maker and taxing authority.
But any possibility of state-wide efficiencies and economies of scale would be greatly
diminished, and we believe it would be impossible to break the freeze on local property
tax increases.
So we do not recommend this approach.

37

For the full text of the letter, see Appendix C.
30-A MRSA § 1501 provides that the Sheriff has custody and charge of the jail...and the appointment of
the jail (administrator). But in 30-A MRSA § 709, the County Commissioners are responsible for setting
the annual budget to the BOC.
38
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2. Create four regional jail authorities.
This proposal called for dividing Maine into four mandatory regional authorities modeled
along the lines of the Two Bridges Regional Jail Authority, with multiple counties
cooperating to achieve regional efficiencies and economies of scale, programs, shared
accommodations, training, etc.
But the Commission was concerned such an approach would also serve to create more
sub-state bureaucracies without addressing the causes of the deadlocks that have
characterized the current system.
Still, there can be a constructive role for voluntary collaboration among various counties
on different issues, and our recommended approach recognizes and encourages such
arrangements, where they do not conflict with the exercise of authority by the BOC or
the DOC.
3. A DOC takeover of the county jail system.
Again, this approach would have the virtue of reuniting decision-making with taxing
authority, and take advantage of a unified command and control system that could
provide consistency in policy and administration statewide, with a greater opportunity to
realize economies of scale.
On the other hand, a single statewide system would be unable to adjust to local pay
scales and thus might incur additional, unnecessary costs.
More importantly, such unification would overturn 350 years of political culture and
tradition in Maine, requiring a redefinition of the roles of county officials and employees,
and perhaps of the county government system itself.
We are not prepared to recommend this step, but future Legislatures may find such
restructuring necessary if the approach we do recommend fails to successfully resolve
the issues facing the current system.
4. Restructure the current BOC system.
Considering the numerous, serious problems of the current system, it is reasonable to
question whether it can achieve its goals with only a few, pivotal statutory changes.
We believe that with the right leadership structure, proper incentives and disincentives
for system participants, and legal authority to require standardization in key areas, the
original goals of controlling costs, achieving statewide consistency and minimizing
additional infrastructure can be achieved.
We recommend this set of reforms because achieving Maine’s objectives in the least
disruptive way, preserving as much of our traditional system as we can, seems the most
prudent course of action.
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Those few, pivotal reforms are as follows.

XV. Recommendations
The Commission formulates its recommendations in the form of responses to the root causes of
the problems identified, as follows:
1. VISION
a. Root Cause
The BOC has lacked a unifying vision to support its various activities and
the energy to set a direction and make progress.
b. Solution
The State and the counties should commit themselves by law to a set of
common purposes to be established by the Legislature, including:
(i) protection of public safety statewide;
(ii) assurance of equal treatment in the criminal justice system statewide;
(iii) movement towards equality in the tax effort devoted to county
corrections statewide;
(iv) actions to achieve efficiencies, economies of scale, and full utilization
of facilities statewide;
(v) a reduction in recidivism
(vi) collaboration with and coordination of programs and services with the
DOC.
Such a solution would be consistent with recommendation A-15 of the
NIC USDOJ report of 2011 which advocated “the Board should seek legislation
to redefine the scope of [its] purpose and authority.”39
c. Relationship of solution to problems identified
The adoption of a vision of a unified, statewide system relates to the 10
problems identified by the Commission.
d. Statutory changes needed
34-A MRSA § 1801(2) already empowers the BOC to adopt goals and
objectives. The BOC has also adopted some useful “Guiding Principles,”40
which have provided some parameters for action, but express neither a vision
nor a set of goals, both of which are needed to energize the system.
Therefore, § 1801(2) should be amended to express the statewide goals
and mission of the BOC.

39

NIC Report, p 18
Guiding Principles” are set out in Appendix G.

40 “The
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2. BOC REPRESENTATION
a. Root Cause
Currently the BOC’s membership consists of four representatives of
various county interests, two Administration, one municipal and two public
members, following amendment of the statute in 2011.41
The amendment was added to assure a high level of county corrections
expertise within the BOC, but it came at the cost of further isolating the BOC from
the State government, which provides an ever increasing share of the costs, and
promotes a culture of mutual forbearance among the counties, which in turn has
contributed to an impasse in decision making.
b. Solution
It might have been helpful to the BOC in successfully carrying out its
mission if the (i) Legislative and Executive branches have confidence in its
membership, (ii) the Board operate with a manageable size and odd number of
members, (iii) that the interests of the taxpayers be represented, as well as (iv)
retaining the perspective and expertise of the counties.

Such a recommendation would have been consistent with the
findings of NIC, USDOJ that “the Board should evaluate its membership
annually and determine if changes should be made in its composition
and/or the composition of its committees.”42
It might be argued that membership should be made in accordance with
the proportional revenue contributions to the support of the jails. But since the
State is putting in 100% of the marginal cost, it also could be argued that they
should have the decisive voice in how its contribution is spent. In any event, a
majority of the Commission members decided that the benefits of retaining the
current representation of the counties outweighed other considerations.
c. Relationship of solution to problems identified
Changing composition of the membership of the Board to reflect State
and taxpayer interests relates to the 10 problems identified by the Commission.
d. Statutory changes needed
34-A MRSA § 1802 it was proposed this be amended to provide for a
manageably sized council representative of the funders of the system, its
operators and the public. It is reasonable to stay with nine members, nominated
by the Governor and confirmed by the Legislature, but with a new composition,
as follows:
i. One County Commissioner;
ii. One Sheriff;
iii. One County Manager/ Administrator;
iv. The Commissioner of Corrections, or his designee;
v. The Commissioner of DAFS, or his designee; and

41 PL

2011, Ch. 374 §9 The current membership is shown on the table in Appendix E
Report, p. 18

42 NIC
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vi. Four members of the public, with relevant experience or appropriate
professional credentials. But again, the decision was made to recommend
staying with the current membership composition.
In any event, beyond professional qualifications, what the BOC urgently
needs are members who have a commitment to a Statewide vision, to
promoting efficiency, and to decisive leadership.
3. LACK OF ENFORCEMENT POWER
a. Root Cause
The BOC has acted as if it is unable to enforce its authority, and has only
offered incentives to encourage innovation infrequently.
b. Solution
The BOC will accomplish little without the power to enforce its judgments.
In this context both financial and operational sanctions are indispensable,
including:
(i) The power to award discretionary funding to support innovative or
efficient programs
(ii) To incentivize counties to operate as efficiently as possible, it should
be able to retain the current year savings it achieves through good corrections
management without an offset of the State or County appropriations otherwise
due. The county can use such savings for reinvestment within the jail facility,
including funding otherwise unfunded liabilities up to amounts approved by its
auditors.
(iii) The disposition of federal and State boarding revenues cuts both
ways. If all the revenue accrues to the host county, it is incentivized to maximize
such revenue, given the higher boarding rates paid by the federal government,
which reduces financial burden on that county.
On the other hand, such a revenue maximization strategy can hurt other
counties if the federal prisoner maximizing county sends its own inmates to other
counties at a lower rate, or forces other overcrowded counties to transport its
inmates a greater distance to another less crowded facility.
A majority of the Commission concluded that all such revenue should
accrue to the benefit of the host county, and not be used to offset State or
County appropriations otherwise due.
Whichever way the Legislature decides, the law should be amended to
provide a clear rule on the division of boarding revenue to forestall future,
unproductive disputes at the BOC.
(iv) The power to withhold payments otherwise due to counties who:
- refuse to accept prisoners assigned;
- fail to comply with accounting and budgeting protocols;
- fail to curtail spending when directed to do so;
- improperly refund monies to counties;
- fail to operate in accordance with standards set by the BOC
or DOC;
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- fail to offer programs and services as required by the BOC or
DOC
(v) In the event of serious or systematic failure to comply with regulations,
standards or policies of the BOC, they have the authority to request the
DOC to assume operational control of a correctional facility in the noncompliant county, with appropriate funding adjustments.
c. Relationship of solution to problems identified
While the BOC is charged with many responsibilities, providing adequate
authority to enforce its decisions will address several of the 10 problems
identified by the Commission.
d. Statutory changes needed
34-A MRSA § 1806 should be amended to add a new subsection giving
the BOC explicit authority to withhold funds otherwise due or declare a county
ineligible to receive some or all funds during periods when it is in non-compliance
with the directives, policies or rules of the BOC, or, in serious cases, recommend
assumption of control of a facility by the DOC.
4. LACK OF EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP
a. Root Cause
The BOC has been in existence for six years. During that period it has
employed four executive directors. Besides lack of continuity, the Board has not
defined of the role of Director in a way that has empowered its staff with
leadership responsibility.
As a result, the Commission itself has taken on much of the staff role,
getting lost in detail, rather than setting broad priorities and advocacy effectively
for its principles, protocols and budgets.
AS RHR Smith and Co. recommended in their review of BOC operations,
“Analyzing and reconciling financial information before meetings can help free up
the BOC to focus on its stated mission. Many of [its] initiatives...will require the
time and ability to engage in strategic planning, cost benefits analysis, and
building partnerships.”43
b. Solution
In its recent report, RHR Smith, observed “there are no internal policies
that clearly define goals, roles and responsibilities for the BOC Executive
Director…”44
The role, responsibilities and pay grade of the Executive Director should
be defined in BOC regulations.
There should be a clear understanding that the BOC is responsible for
setting policy and enforcing decisions, while the Director is responsible for the
staff work, data collection and analysis of the Commission and carrying out the
policies of the Board.

43 Smith,
44 Smith,

p9
p7
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The addition of a financial director to the organization should also prove
helpful in the immediate future.
It is critical the BOC staff develops strong working relationships with both
the counties and the DOC.
c. Relationship of solution to problems identified
Strengthening the role of the Executive Director relates to the 10
problems identified by the Commission.
d. Statutory changes needed
34-A MRSA § 1803-A should be amended to explicitly define the roles
and pay grades of the Director, Financial Analyst and Fiscal Agent, since the
BOC has not done so.
Moreover, the BOC should be able to call on the expertise and resources
of the DOC to minimize the growth of a new bureaucracy.
5. LACK OF COMMON ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
a. Root Cause
In the original 2008 legislation, the BOC was empowered to require a
common budget reporting system, 30-A MRSA § 710(1).
However, this authority has proven too inconsistent, and in a detailed and
critical report in June 2013, the authors concluded “There have been instances of
inconsistency, resulting from the counties’ lack of clear understanding of their
responsibilities, and the BOC’s expectations, regarding budgeting, allocation,
cash flow needs, fund balance and contingency funding, thus making it difficult to
compare data between time periods or counties for meaningful analysis.”45
b. Solution
As RHR Smith noted, “The ability to capture, analyze and interpret
financial information that is reliable, credible and accurate is essential to the
BOC’s process. This information can be used to make routine decisions, project
future expenditures, and communicate current and future needs of the
Investment Fund to counties, the general public, and the Legislature with
confidence.”46
Thus, requiring a common chart of accounts and consistency of coding
expenses, and adopting consistent fiscal policies and auditing policies must be at
the heart of any reform to make the BOC effective. Likewise, both technical
assistance to the counties and compliance mechanisms will be necessary to
bring the process to life.
c. Relationship of solution to problems identified
Requiring consistent financial and performance data related to the 10
problems identified by the Commission.
d. Statutory changes needed

45
46

Smith, p 4
Smith, p 9

29

34-A MRSA § 1803 should be amended to give the BOC the authority to
establish and enforce a single chart of accounts for county corrections-related
expenditures for all financial management purposes. Additionally, to require
budget submissions by the counties in a manner consistent with and timed to
integrate with the State budgeting and auditing processes.
6. LACK OF WILL OR AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE ITS DECISIONS
a. Root Cause
While the BOC reports extraordinary frustration at its inability to fulfill its
mission or execute its policies, there is a legitimate question as to what is holding
it back other than an attitude of deference towards individual counties.
For example:
(i) Somerset County is refusing to accept prisoners from other counties
because it thinks the boarding rate is unfair. But the BOC has taken no action to
compel Somerset to fulfill its statutory duty, allowing the county to take the
initiative with its own lawsuit concerning funding.
(ii) Meanwhile, Franklin County is forced to send prisoners to State postconviction facilities in Windham instead of to Skowhegan 25 miles away.
(iii) Waldo County is, by its own admission, refunding $233,000 to its
taxpayers, rather than meeting its obligations to the overall state system, thus
increasing the amount the BOC must seek from the General Fund.
(iv) The BOC has been unable to decide whether to ask the Legislature to
fund either its “actual” or a maximal budget for FY14, and has not yet approved
any budget for FY15, thus jeopardizing its opportunity to secure needed funding.
(v) Some counties are not providing the financial data necessary to
formulate an accurate budget, but the BOC has been unable to correct this
problem; and
(vi) Washington and Hancock Counties, for instance, are enduring
significant facility deterioration without any assistance from the BOC.
These are illustrations of current problems in decision-making at the
BOC, rather than an exhaustive list.
b. Solution
The solutions to the paralysis in decision-making are:
(i) increase the authority of the BOC to mandate policies and actions of
Statewide significance, including the ability to enter into contracts binding on all
the counties to achieve economies of scale;
(ii) ensure the BOC has a set of incentives and sanctions sufficient to
enforce its decisions.
c. Relationship of solution to problems identified
Reforming the authority of the BOC is absolutely essential to making the
organization useful for achieving standardization, economies of scale and
efficiencies any time soon, and will help resolve several of the ten major issues.
d. Statutory changes needed
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(i) Rulemaking: The BOC should have the authority to set policies and
adopt routine technical rules to promote consistent management of operations,
encourage innovative programs and services and undertake long term planning
for capital needs.
The Commission also proposes that the Criminal Justice Committee
authorize any major new substantive rules to facilitate the aforementioned
activities and additionally to empower the BOC with the authority to implement
and enforce compliance with its decisions.
(ii) Standards: To promote efficiency and fairness, the BOC should have
the authority to set and enforce standards concerning:
●
Management Information Systems and their interconnections;
●
Security equipment;
●
Inmate classification;
●
Pretrial services;
●
Assignment of inmates among the county jails;
●
Staffing qualifications and ratios; and
●
Bed space determination/ classification.
(iii) Contracting: Amend 34-A MRSA §1803(1)(f) to maximize the potential
savings that might be realized from contracting for goods and services that can
be used by multiple counties, the BOC should have the authority to contract on
behalf of any or all of the counties unilaterally, to either piggy-backing on State
DOC contracts or acting on its own for:
●
Medical and mental health services;
●
Pharmaceuticals;
●
Food and food services;
●
Appliances and equipment;
●
Telecommunications equipment and computer hardware and
software;
●
Insurance policies; and
●
Other goods and services it may identify by policy from time to
time.
(iv) Back Office Services: The BOC should have the authority to provide
support services needed by any county correctional systems, on a contractual
basis with the consent of an interested county for:
●
Hiring and human resources;
●
Civil rights;
●
Risk management and insurance;
●
Training;
●
Financial management, budgeting and procurement;
●
Management information systems; and
●
Other services it may identify from time to time.
(v) Assignment of Inmates: The BOC should have the authority to
establish and maintain a coordinated system for pre-trial detainees and others
housed in the county jails as follows:
●
The BOC shall establish rules under which it may demand any
county facility to accept any inmate from any other county facility,
the State or the Federal government.
●
The BOC shall set standards for the software necessary to
facilitate transportation of inmates among facilities so as to create
a truly Statewide system of assignments.
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(vi) Regional Authorities: The various counties are encouraged to enter
into mutual, voluntary agreements to procure and provide goods and services
and mutual aid of any kind, and in fact, is strongly encouraged by the
Commission, on such terms and conditions as they may from time to time agree,
so long as such agreements are limited to subjects and to the extent to which the
DOC or BOC have not exercised such authority.
(vii) Monitoring Performance: The BOC should have the authority to
monitor the operational, programmatic and financial performance of the county
jails and to establish appropriate metrics for comparison of the counties among
themselves and with other appropriate jurisdictions, and require timely reporting
in a consistent format, with appropriate penalties for non-compliance.

XVI. Additional Recommendations
In addition to the foregoing recommendations intended to address the root causes of the
problems which have made the current system largely unsuccessful, there are administrative
measures which we believe would make the current system more workable, as follows:
Budget Reform
a. Adopt a growth formula to standardize and guide budget planning.
Create and adopt a biennial budget growth formula for budget planning purposes
that projects approved future growth in operational costs, and a second for
capital costs. The operational formula would be based on the LD 1 cap as
applied currently to the county payments. 30-A MRSA § 706(A)(1).
A formula for replacing the current “actual costs of corrections” standard (34-A
MRSA § 1803(5) (E)) with an objective measure consistent with the discipline
elsewhere in government for operations expenditure budgeting would reduce
uncertainty and eliminate creation of unrealistic budget proposals which cost
considerable time and effort.
b. The County Corrections budget process should track and be synchronized with
the State process.
Budget instructions based on the Growth Formula should be sent from DAFS to
the BOC. The BOC should transmit the same to the Counties, based on a BOC
approved allocation formula.
The County Commissioners, after consultation with the Sheriffs, Jail
Administrators and other relevant officials should submit a two part budget in a
DAFS-approved format to the BOC. Part 1 would continue current operations.
Part 2 would propose any additional programs, services or other initiatives a
County wishes to propose.
After review, revisions and approval, under 34-A MRSA §1803(1)(A), the BOC
would approve any Part 1 request of a County, which is below the Growth
Formula cap.
The BOC would review and vote on any Part 2 requests by any County, in its
submission to DAFS. The BOC will be required to rule in a timely manner on
such requests to stay within the State budget process timeline.
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In the event the Governor reduces or eliminates any BOC requests from his
budget, the BOC shall have the right to report its original request directly to the
Legislature.
In the event the Legislature appropriates less than the full Part 1 amount
requested, the BOC shall allocate the deficiency among the Counties to minimize
the impact on county corrections operations overall.
c. Benefits
The Legislature is currently unaware of the full extent of county corrections
systems needs. Moreover, the BOC consumes extraordinary amounts of time
examining the detail of Part 1. This separation of on-going LD 1 capped funding
from consideration of new and additional spending in excess of the cap should
reduce the amount of time the BOC uses up on budget issues.
d. Statutory Changes Needed
Amend 34-A § 1803(5) (E) by replacing “actual costs” with an amount not in
excess of the cap generally applicable to County expenditures contained in
30-A MRSA § 706(A). In addition, the BOC may request additional
appropriations, clearly identified for new or expanded programs or under the
emergency circumstances described in 34-A MRSA § 1803(5)(D).

XVII. Capital Planning and Finance
1. Current Situation
Since the BOC was established, no new county correctional facility has been
constructed.
However, the Legislature clearly contemplated that the BOC would play a role in the
closure of older or unneeded facilities, and changes in the missions of existing facilities.
34-A MRSA §1803(2)(A) and (C ).
Likewise, the BOC was given the authority to review and either approve or reject plans
for new facilities using a “certificate of need” process, 34-A MRSA §1803(4).
Pursuant to these responsibilities, the BOC developed a “Draft Policy Statement” entitled
“One Maine One System” to govern capital improvement planning for county correctional
facilities in June, 2009.47
It was considered by the BOC at its November and December, 2011 meetings, but not
adopted as presented.
It would have required a 10 year capital improvement plan (CIP) for each county, though
priorities could be adjusted during that period. It called for the counties to use up their
“fund balances” at the end of a FY first, and then apply to the BOC for additional funds
needed.

47

“One Maine, One System - A Plan for a Unified State Correctional System for Maine,” created by Maine
DOC, June 2009, Appendix L
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Capital funding is also supposed to be made available through the “Inverse Debt” fund,
34-A MRSA §1803(5)(E), but in fact no funds have actually been appropriated for this
purpose. It is hardly surprising the Legislature would not assign this cause high priority in
the absence of a comprehensive Statewide capital plan demonstrating needs, and
setting priorities.
In particular, there have been no further changes or mission closures or new
construction since the first days of the BOC.
Still, in the past 10 years, there has been further deterioration and decay in the physical
plants at several jails, and minor capital investments by individual counties acting on
their own.48
The RHR Smith accounting review also faulted the planning process, observing “the
BOC lacks policies for dealing with counties’ capital and noncapital contingencies. This
makes demand on the Investment Fund hopelessly unpredictable.”49
Besides the absence of long term planning and a mechanism for prioritizing capital
projects, there are further important problems in the financing of projects.
For short-term projects, the problem is that the ability to finance them depends on the
amount a county happens to have in its surplus in a given year, regardless of how its
needs compare in urgency to other counties.
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, the Commission recommends that the Counties be
authorized to utilize surplus funds to create their own capital improvement accounts and
accounts to cover unfunded liabilities up to levels approved by their auditors, which shall
not offset State or County appropriations otherwise due.
For long-term, major projects, the cost must be borne by county taxpayers, regardless of
the relative tax effort needed. Thus, a poor county might defer a greatly needed project,
while a wealthier county can afford a less compelling project.
The costs of the present system are well illustrated by the plight of Somerset County,
which voted for a $29.2m facility to be paid for by a county bond issue, which has
resulted in a per capita cost of $20.62.
In considering the bed mechanism to fund capital needs, the Commission believes, the
BOC should develop a long term plan to alter the property tax burden for the counties to
equalize citizen contributions to county jail operations and existing and future capital
debt service expense, including through application of state funds appropriated for that
purpose, by accounting for an appropriate proportion of non-property tax revenues for
jail operations, such as prisoner boarding and per diem revenues from state and federal
sources, and by other means to equalize property tax burdens.
2. Options for Capital Investment in the Future
There are four aspects to capital investment in county correctional facilities:
A. Planning;
48 BJA

Report, p 3
p5

49 Smith,
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B. Financing;
C. Ownership; and
D. Location.
For each of these factors the responsibility could be placed with the county, the State or
the BOC.
Many permutations have been adopted in Maine for other capital projects by other
government agencies.
Historically, of course, jails were planned, paid for and owned by the counties.
But, as the State establishes standards and the BOC legislation contemplates a unified
system, such autonomy seems inconsistent with the purposes of the law.
A second model is that of regional jail authorities like the Two Bridges Facility in
Wiscasset, with regional planning, finances and ownership, but the experience of TBJA
has been fraught with conflict and litigation.
A third is using the State DOC for all four. This would raise problems with the
management and use of a state facility by different organizations.
A fourth alternative would be something akin to the system Maine uses for funding new
school construction.
In the case of the schools, local districts do the planning in accordance with State
standards, the Board of Education prioritizes projects against established criteria, and
financing is shared by the State, through the GPA funds, and the local district by a bond
issue.
The advantages of this model applied to development of a unified county corrections
system include:
(a) consistent standards for planning;
(b) prioritization of projects on a statewide basis;
(c) sharing the costs between the local organizations and the state, taking into
account ability to pay;
(d) ownership by the entity that will be managing, staffing and using the facility;
and
(e) proper determination of need and location for any new jail construction.
The day will come when a jail must be replaced because of age and condition. In the
meantime, there will be a continued need for capital upgrades and preventative
maintenance and equipment replacement. Yet we do not have a handle on the size or
pace of needs, or its relationship to the “inverse debt.” Maine urgently needs to adopt a
rational, planned capital expenditures budget. An approach based on the current K-12
school construction system may be an appropriate template.
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XVIII. Conclusion
The Appropriations Committee in its June 3, 2013 letter characterized the current system as a
“confederation.”
That is a bad thing - confederations don’t tend to last very long or work very effectively.
As Alexander Hamilton observed in advocating for replacing the Articles of Confederation
Government of the American States with a union under a new constitution, organizations
without the power to raise revenue or enforce their decisions are devoid of energy and destined
to fail.50
The Committee expressed concern that the BOC lacked operational control or enforcement
capacity or the ability to ensure receipt of its revenues.
The analysis and recommendations in the report are intended to remedy those problems, and
create the unified system originally envisioned, with the least disruption possible to the
traditional institutions in Maine government.
We have tried to achieve that balance by recommending legislation to provide for:
1. A greater vision of a single system achieving economies of scale, prioritized capital
planning, operational efficiencies, universally accessible pretrial services and a
reasonably equitable distribution of the tax burden;
2. Financial and operational incentives and sanctions to promote compliance with the
regulations, policies and disincentives of the BOC;
3. Explicitly defined responsibilities for the BOC executive leadership, to free up the
Commission members to focus on broad public policies;
4. Adoption and enforcement of common accounting standards and performance reporting
metrics;
5. Conferring on the authority to the BOC to enter into contracts on behalf of the counties,
provide back office services, coordinate prisoner assignments and evaluate
appropriation requests to the Legislature, among other things;
6. Create a mechanism for planning and funding capital expenditures on an orderly,
transparent, system-wide basis; and
7. More effectively address some administrative issues, including management of bail
services and budget formulation.
8. Understanding that the budget is likely to be approximately $2.8 million short for FY
2014 given certain assumptions. This Legislation should address that shortfall and
ensure a realistic amount for FY 201551 and begin funding the sinking fund for future
capital consideration by a supplemental appropriation bill for consideration at the 2nd
session of the 126th Legislature.

50

“Government implies the power to make laws. It is essential to the idea of a law, it be attended with a
sanction. In other words, a penalty for disobedience. If there are no penalties annexed to disobedience,
the resolution...which pretends to be law will in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or
recommendations.” Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, No. 15
51 See Appendix K
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We hope this combination of measures will give the BOC energy, decisiveness and
accountability to the Legislature.
It is the best way we know to preserve the operational authority of the old system, while
achieving the Statewide fairness and efficiency current circumstances demand.
But in the end, we must replace the current unworkable confederacy with a truly unified
system.
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED REPORT CARD
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A- 2

A- 3

A- 4

A- 5

A- 6

A- 7

A- 8

A- 9

A-10

A-11

A-12

A-13

A-14

Appendix B: Task Force Agendas

AGENDA - JAIL TASK FORCE
9/20/13 - MEETING ONE
1.
Welcome and Introductions - Chair Flanagan
2.
Review of Authorizing Legislation - Chair Flanagan
3.
How We Got Here - Bob Devlin
4.
Report on Financial Status of BOC - Scott Ferguson
5.
Identify Issues Need to be Addressed - Chair Flanagan
6.
Formulation of Statement of Problems & Identification of Objectives - Chair Flanagan
(based on survey distributed)
7.
What Documents will be Needed
8.
Other Stakeholders to Include
9.
Ground Rules for Committee
10. Meeting Schedule and Topics
11. Other
12. Adjourn
AGENDA - JAIL TASK FORCE
10/4/13 - MEETING TWO
The Commission will hold a public hearing beginning at nine AM, until not later than 11 AM
Friday, October 4 in room 301A, also known as the Board of Corrections Board Room of the
Marquardt Building in Augusta. The public is invited to testify with respect to revisions to the
statutes relating to the County Jail System, the Board of Corrections and the state unified
system. 16 copies of testimony are requested the morning of the hearing. Time will be allocated
equitably to assure all parties have an opportunity to be heard. Following the hearing, the
Commission will continue the meeting to discuss sub- committee progress to date and review
hearing presentations. All are welcome.
AGENDA - JAIL TASK FORCE
10/25/13 - MEETING THREE
1. Call to Order
2. Approval of Minutes from October 4 meeting
3. Presentation of Committee Reports
4. Discussion of Reports
5. Next Steps
6. Adjourn
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AGENDA - JAIL TASK FORCE

11/01/13 - MEETING FOUR
1. Call to Order
2. Introductions & Review of Meeting Expectations (Chair)
3. Review of Options
a. Return to County Control and Responsibility (Chair)
b. Adopt a State Unified System (Whitten)
c. Amend BOC/Create Regional Authorities (Crichton)
d. Amend BOC/ Increased County Role & Responsibility (Baldacci)
4. Comments of Rod Miller re BJA Report (Miller via phone)
5. Discussion of pros and cons of options presented
6. Straw vote on principles to incorporate in legislation
7. Discussion of outline of the Commission Report
8. Discussion of next steps and timetable
9. Adjourn
AGENDA - JAIL TASK FORCE
11/15/13 - MEETING FIVE
1. Call to Order
2. Welcome and Introductions
3. Approval of Minutes from October 4 meeting
4. Brief Analysis of Member Survey
5. Concepts in the Report
6. Discussions
7. Straw Draft of Proposed Legislation
8. Adjourn
AGENDA- JAIL TASK FORCE
12/6/13 - MEETING SIX
1. Call to Order
2. Welcome and Introductions
3. Approval of Minutes from November 15 meeting
4. Discussion of Draft Report
5. Approve Proposed Solutions
6. Adjourn

A-16

appendix c: Letter from joint
standing committee on
appropriations & finanical affairs
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Appendix D “Maine State Caseload 5year Trends”

http://www.courts.state.me.us/reports_pubs/reports/5yr%20Court%20Stats%20for%20Internet/All%20Courts%20C
aseload%20FY'09_FY'13.pdf

Appendix E: BOC Membership, November 2013
Carleton Barnes,
Jr.
Douglas Beaulieu
Randall Liberty
Amy Fowler
Mary Louise
McEwen
Susan Morisette

Manager
County
Administrator
Sheriff
County
Commissioner
Superintendent
Consultant

Joseph Ponte
Stuart Smith
Mark Westrum,
chair

Commissioner
Selectman
Correctional
Administrator

Vacant

Executive Director
Executive
Associate

Jane Tower

Wesserunsett
Consulting, LLC

Calais

Aroostook County
Kennebec County

Caribou
Augusta

Waldo County
Riverview
Psychiatric Center

Palermo

Maine Department
of Corrections
Town of Edgecomb
Two Bridges
Regional Jail
State Board of
Corrections
Maine Department
of Corrections

Augusta
Winslow
Augusta
Edgecomb
Wiscasset
Augusta
Augusta
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Appendix F: Proposed Capital Projects in 20072008

Appendix G: Board of Corrections Purpose, Goals & Guiding Principles
PURPOSE AND GOALS
1. Purpose of the board. The purpose of the board is to develop and implement a unified
correctional system that demonstrates sound fiscal management, achieves efficiencies,
reduces recidivism and ensures the safety and security of correctional staff, inmates,
visitors, volunteers and surrounding communities.
2. State goals. The board shall develop goals to guide the development of and evaluate the
effectiveness of a unified correctional system. The board shall present its goals for
review and approval by the joint standing committee of the Legislature having jurisdiction
over criminal justice and public safety matters. The goals must include benchmarks for
performance in the following areas:
○

Recidivism reduction;

○

Pretrial diversion; and

○

Rate of incarceration.
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Responsibilities and duties
1. Manage the cost of corrections.
2. Determine correctional facility use and purpose.
3. Adopt treatment standards and policies.
4. Certificate of need.
5. Administrative duties.
6. Receive and review recommendations.
Downloaded from http://www.maine.gov/corrections/BOC/purpose.htm on 9/22/13

GUIDING PRINCIPLES
A Unified State and County Corrections System that:
• Reduces risk through the use of the Evidence Based Practices and encourages sentencing in
accordance with risk;
• Creates an integrated, regional system build on the strengths of the existing state and county
facilities and services and is based on differentiated missions;
• Is a stewardship approach that manages and maintains the existing assets and resources for
the maximum benefit and invests strategically to accomplish system goals;
• Allows innovation, but is collaboratively based and recognizes that decisions about change and
its management are shared;
• Creates incentives for us all to work together and promotes cohesion;
• Is consistent with the compromise enacted in Public Law 653;
• Incorporates the recommendations of the Corrections Alternatives Advisory Committee and the
two plans developed by the state and the counties;
• Meets the system’s needs for risk management and security housing;
• Works in concert with other policy makers including the Legislature, the Judiciary and the
Sentencing Council, and;
• Involves and includes local stakeholders including prosecutors, local law enforcement, and
others.
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Appendix H: Jail Costs Per Capita by County

Alex Kimball 2013
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APPENDIX I
THREE DEFICIT FUNDING SCENARIOS

What percent of 3rd and 4th Quarter IF payments will the counties need?

100%
Does the BOC receive mission change revenues? Y or N

y
Does Somerset receive 2nd half 2013 Payment? Y or N

n
Does Somerset receive 2014 Payment? Y or N

n
Does Franklin become full service jail? Y or N

n

Revenues
Starting cash balance
Investment Fund Revenues
CCA
Court Fines, Surcharges, Per Diem's
Major Mission Change
Franklin Mission Change
Prior Year Carryforward
Total Revenues
Expenses
Investment Fund Payments
Somerset 2nd half 2013
Somerset 2014 (IF & CCA)
CCA
Board & Personnel
Total Expenses

Net Deficit

Full Year
n/a
$
6,536,295
$
5,646,562
$
786,259
$
1,029,751
$
$
$

Amount Remaining
$
4,098,340
$
$
$
525,950
$
1,029,751
$
180,248
328,600 $
14,327,467 $
5,834,289
12,886,356 $
$
$
5,398,112 $
164,032 $
18,448,500 $

7,367,263
1,129,312
186,291
8,682,866

$ (4,121,033) $

(2,848,577)

$
$
$
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What percent of 3rd and 4th Quarter IF payments will the counties need?

80%
Does the BOC receive mission change revenues? Y or N

y
Does Somerset receive 2nd half 2013 Payment? Y or N

n
Does Somerset receive 2014 Payment? Y or N

n
Does Franklin become full service jail? Y or N

n

Revenues
Starting cash balance
Investment Fund Revenues
CCA
Court Fines, Surcharges, Per Diem's
Major Mission Change
Franklin Mission Change
Prior Year Carryforward
Total Revenues
Expenses
Investment Fund Payments
Somerset 2nd half 2013
Somerset 2014 (IF & CCA)
CCA
Board & Personnel
Total Expenses

Net Deficit

Full Year
n/a
$
6,536,295
$
5,646,562
$
786,259
$
1,029,751
$
$
$

Amount Remaining
$
4,098,340
$
$
$
525,950
$
1,029,751
$
180,248
328,600 $
14,327,467 $
5,834,289
12,886,356 $
$
$
5,398,112 $
164,032 $
18,448,500 $

5,893,810
1,129,312
186,291
7,209,413

$ (4,121,033) $

(1,375,124)

$
$
$
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What percent of 3rd and 4th Quarter IF payments will the counties need?

100%
Does the BOC receive mission change revenues? Y or N

y
Does Somerset receive 2nd half 2013 Payment? Y or N

y
Does Somerset receive 2014 Payment? Y or N

y
Does Franklin become full service jail? Y or N

n

Revenues
Starting cash balance
Investment Fund Revenues
CCA
Court Fines, Surcharges, Per Diem's
Major Mission Change
Franklin Mission Change
Prior Year Carryforward
Total Revenues
Expenses
Investment Fund Payments
Somerset 2nd half 2013
Somerset 2014 (IF & CCA)
CCA
Board & Personnel
Total Expenses

Net Deficit

Full Year
n/a
$
6,536,295
$
5,646,562
$
786,259
$
1,029,751
$
$
$

Amount Remaining
$
4,098,340
$
$
$
525,950
$
1,029,751
$
180,248
328,600 $
14,327,467 $
5,834,289
12,886,356 $
$
$
5,398,112 $
164,032 $
18,448,500 $

7,367,263
560,884
1,370,216
1,129,312
186,291
10,613,966

$ (4,121,033) $

(4,779,677)

$
$
$
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APPENDIX J
OVERVIEW OF JAIL FUNDING SOURCES

Funds and Purpose

Overview of Jail funding Sources
Type of Fund

Source

Purpose

Amount

Community Corrections

State Allocation

Community Corrections
Programs

$

Inverse Debt

None

Capital Needs

$

Investment Fund

State Allocation

Jail Operating Expenses

$

12,886,355.00

Federal Inmates

US Marshalls

Reimbursement for housing
federal inmates

$

3,630,601.00

County

Property Taxes

Jail Operating Expenses

$

61,808,927.00

Other

Misc

Mostly reimbursements for
inmates from other agencies

$

196,934.00

$

84,169,379.00

Total Revenues

5,646,562.00

-
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APPENDIX K
FY 15 DEFICIT CALCULATOR

FY 15 Deficit Calculator
What percent of IF payments will the counties need?

100%
Does Somerset receive FY 15 IF Payments? (Y or N)

y
What is the Statewide average LD 1 Cap?

3.6%
What is the most recent 1-Year CPI?

1.0%

Revenues
Investment Fund Revenues
CCA
Court Fines, Surcharges, Per Diem's
Major Mission Change
Franklin Mission Change
Prior Year Carryforward
Total Revenues
Expenses
Investment Fund Payments
Somerset County Payments
CCA
Board & Personnel
Total Expenses

Net Deficit

FY 14 Projected
$
6,536,295
$
5,646,562
$
786,259
$
1,029,751
$
678,026
$
328,600
$
15,005,493

FY 15 Budgets
$
6,536,295
$
5,646,562
$
786,259
$
1,029,751
$
678,026
$
$
14,676,893

FY 15 LD 1 Max
$
6,536,295
$
5,646,562
$
786,259
$
1,029,751
$
678,026
$
$
14,676,893

FY 15 CPI
$
6,536,295
$
5,646,562
$
786,259
$
1,029,751
$
678,026
$
$
14,676,893

$

11,764,589

$
$
$

5,398,112
164,032
17,326,733

$
$
$
$
$

15,523,759
1,121,767
5,398,112
200,000
22,243,638

$
$
$
$
$

14,325,366
1,365,033
5,398,112
200,000
21,288,511

$
$
$
$
$

12,475,915
1,189,341
5,398,112
200,000
19,263,368

$

(2,321,240)

$

(7,566,745)

$

(6,611,618)

$

(4,586,475)
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APPENDIX L
DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT
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